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OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT OF RAPID REGIONAL RESPONSE PROGRAM CONTRACTS IN SOUTH-CENTRAL IRAQ S SIIG GIIR R--0 05 5--0 02 23 3 JJAANNUUAARRYY 2 23 20 3,, 2 00 06 6 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION January 23, 2006 MEMORANDUM FOR UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND – IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN COMMANDER, JOINT AREA SUPPORT GROUP - CENTRAL SUBJECT: Management of Rapid Regional Response Program Contracts in South-Central Iraq (SIGIR-05-023) We are providing this audit report for your information and use. We performed the audit in accordance with our statutory duties contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, which mandates the independent and objective conduct of audits relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. Public Law 108-106, as amended, requires that we provide for the independent and objective leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse. The Chief of Mission of the United States Embassy Baghdad did not respond to the draft of this report. However, we considered management comments from the Joint Contracting CommandIraq/Afghanistan, and the Joint Area Support Group-Central on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. Comments by those organizations conformed to requirements and left no unresolved issues. We request comments on the final report from the Chief of Mission of the United States Embassy Baghdad by February 13, 2006. Please send management comments, with the signature of the authorized official, in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat) to SIGIRAuditReports@sigir.mil. We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this report, please contact Mr. Joseph T. McDermott at (914) 822-4618, or by email at joseph.mcdermott@iraq.centcom.mil, or Mr. Clifton Spruill at (703) 343-8816 or (914) 822-2798, or by email at clifton.spruill@iraq.centcom.mil. For the report distribution, see Appendix K. Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. Inspector General 400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Report No. SIGIR-05-023 January 23, 2006 Management of Rapid Regional Response Program Contracts in South-Central Iraq Executive Summary Introduction. This audit report is one of a series of reports addressing controls over cash, contract management, and grants management for the Coalition Provisional Authority South-Central Region. This audit report discusses the processes used for the authorization, award, execution, and oversight of contracts within the Coalition Provisional Authority South-Central Region. During 2003-2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority used contracts to purchase products or services. The contracts were intended to help carry out a program or project that directly benefited the Iraqi people or assisted in the reconstruction and recovery of Iraq. Between October 2003 and June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority SouthCentral Region used funds provided from the Development Fund for Iraq through the Rapid Regional Response Program to award 907 contracts and 1,212 micro-purchases worth approximately $88.1 million. Objective. The overall audit objective was to determine whether disbursing officers in selected locations in southern Iraq complied with applicable guidance and properly controlled and accounted for Development Fund for Iraq cash assets and expenditures. During our audit, we observed deficiencies in contract award documentation and expanded our scope to determine whether Coalition Provisional Authority South-Central Region personnel properly managed contracts. Results. South-Central Region personnel, under the direction of the Coalition Provisional Authority, did not effectively manage 907 contracts and 1,212 micropurchase contracts awarded through the Rapid Regional Response Program in the amount of $88.1 million. As a result, for 907 contracts and 1,212 micro-purchase contracts we reviewed: • 4 projects, using 20 contracts (2.2 percent) and several contract modifications, totaling approximately $9.1 million, appeared to have had the requirements split to keep the contract awards under the $500,000 approval threshold to circumvent the required reviews • 158 contracts (17.4 percent), totaling approximately $16.3 million, were either not competitively awarded or lacked documentation that showed a competitive process had taken place and 26 contract files (3.0 percent), totaling approximately $2.6 million, did not contain a signed contract • 11 contracts (1.2 percent), totaling more than $5.6 million, were issued without proper authorization and 38 contracts (4.2 percent), totaling approximately $7.0 million, were awarded after the transfer of responsibility for the Development Fund for Iraq to the Iraqi government on June 28, 2004 • 91 projects (10.7 percent), totaling approximately $11.6 million, were paid in full at the time of contract signing and the completion of the project work was not verified; 11 contracts (1.2 percent) were overpaid by $571,823; i • • • approximately $515,000 was disbursed for Coalition Provisional Authority salaries and operations in violation of Program Review Board Guidance 06.2 (amended); approximately between $47,000 and $87,000 in cash was lost but not reported to the Coalition Provisional Authority Comptroller; and approximately $23.0 million was transferred to unauthorized personnel but documentation showed only $6.3 million disbursed to contractors resulting in the loss of oversight of $16.7 million 286 contract files (31.5 percent), totaling approximately $31.0 million, did not contain certificates of completion yet $24.0 million had been disbursed for the projects; while other contract files were missing documentation for approximately $12.6 million in disbursements and, consequently, it could not be determined whether contractors were paid for work performed a property record book to document the property purchased with Rapid Regional Response Program funds was not maintained; contract files for 160 vehicles, totaling approximately $3.3 million, did not document the receipt of the vehicles and there was limited documentation in the contract files to identify whether the beneficiary actually received the vehicles; and ammunition and weapons were purchased but detailed records of deliveries and distribution were not maintained and not all of the weapons could be located 346 micro-purchase contracts (28.5 percent) exceeded the micro-purchase dollar limitation of $5,000 yet did not maintain the required documentation in the files for awards in dollar amounts greater than $5,000; 387 micropurchase contract files (31.9 percent) did not contain disbursement documentation; 786 files (64.9 percent) did not contain a vendor invoice; and 838 files (69.1 percent) did not have a completion document We concluded, based on the documentation examined during our review that the Coalition Provisional Authority South-Central Region failed to adequately manage its Rapid Regional Response Program contracts and micro-purchases. Material Internal Control Weaknesses. Our audit identified material internal control weaknesses. U.S. government agents and Coalition partners did not comply with applicable guidance and did not properly control and account for Iraqi cash assets. In addition, based on the award process for contracts and the management of contracts we evaluated, there was no assurance that fraud, waste, and abuse did not occur in the management and administration of assets. Indications of Potential Fraud. During this audit, we found indications of potential fraud and referred these matters to the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, for action. Related investigations are continuing. Prior Recommendations. We issued four previous reports addressing controls over cash, contract management, and grant management for the CPA South-Central Region.1 1 Those four reports were SIGIR Report No. 05-006, “Control of Cash Provided to South-Central Iraq,” April 30, 2005; SIGIR Report No. 05-015, “Management of Rapid Regional Response Program Grants in South-Central Iraq,” October 25, 2005; SIGIR Report No. 05-016, “Management of the Contracts and Grants Used to Construct and Operate the Babylon Police Academy,” October 26, 2005; and SIGIR Report No. 05-020, “Management of the Contracts, Grant, and Micro-Purchases Used to Rehabilitate the Karbala Library,” October 26, 2005. ii We made a total of 31 recommendations to management in those four reports. In response to the recommendations made in those four reports, management generally concurred, agreed to take the necessary actions to resolve the problems discussed, and initiated actions on the specific recommendations. Therefore, the recommendations made in those previous four reports that are applicable to this audit will not be repeated. Recommendations. Since the Coalition Provisional Authority was dissolved on June 28, 2004, we are addressing the recommendations to two of the four successor organizations: the Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan and the Joint Area Support Group-Central, Baghdad; as well as to the United States Ambassador to Iraq. 1. We recommend that the United States Ambassador to Iraq recover specifically the $571,823 that was overpaid on 11 contracts. 2. We recommend that the Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan establish adequate and required documentation to record the receipt and disposal of all purchased property. 3. We recommend that the Commander, Joint Area Support Group - Central, require paying agents to obtain proper contract approval documentation prior to making disbursements. Management Comments and Audit Response. The Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan; and the Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central concurred with the finding and recommendations and the comments received are fully responsive. We provided a draft of this report on December 29, 2005, to the Chief of Mission of the United States Embassy Baghdad. No management comments to the draft of this report were received. Therefore, we request that the Chief of Mission provide comments on this final report by February 13, 2006. iii Table of Contents Executive Summary i Introduction Background Objective 1 3 Finding Management of Contracts and Micro-Purchase Contracts in the South-Central Region 4 Appendixes A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. Scope and Methodology Coalition Provisional Authority Guidance Applicable to Contracts and Micro-Purchase Contracts Coalition Provisional Authority Organizational Responsibilities for Contracts and Micro-Purchase Contracts Present U.S. Government Organizational Responsibilities for Contracts and Micro-Purchase Contracts Contracts Overpaid Previous Audit Recommendations – Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Report No. 05-006, “Control of Cash Provided to South-Central Iraq,” April 30, 2005 Previous Audit Recommendations – Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Report No. 05-015, “Management of Rapid Regional Response Program Grants in South-Central Iraq,” October 25, 2005 Previous Audit Recommendations – Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Report No. 05-016, “Management of the Contracts and Grants Used to Construct and Operate the Babylon Police Academy,” October 26, 2005 Previous Audit Recommendations – Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Report No. 05-020, “Management of the Contracts, Grant, and Micro-Purchases Used to Rehabilitate the Karbala Library,” October 26, 2005 Acronyms Report Distribution Audit Team Members 21 24 25 26 27 28 31 33 35 37 38 40 Management Comments Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 41 42 Introduction Background This audit report is one of a series of reports addressing controls over cash, contract management, and grant management for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) South-Central Region. This audit report discusses the processes used for the authorization, award, execution, and oversight of contracts within the CPA South-Central Region. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1. CPA Regulation Number 1 was issued by the CPA Administrator on May 16, 2003. CPA Regulation Number 1 described the powers and purposes of the CPA and stated: The CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional administration, to restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future, including by advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance and facilitating economic recovery and sustainable reconstruction and development. The Development Fund for Iraq. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, adopted May 22, 2003, noted the establishment of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) and assigned responsibility for managing the fund to the CPA. The resolution noted that the CPA should direct disbursement of DFI funds, in consultation with the Iraqi interim administration. The resolution also required the CPA to use DFI funds in a transparent manner to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, for the costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq. The DFI was the primary financial vehicle to channel revenue from ongoing Iraqi oil sales, unencumbered Oil for Food deposits, and repatriated Iraqi assets into the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. During the CPA administration of Iraq, the CPA Comptroller managed the DFI and the Program Review Board (PRB) was responsible for recommending expenditures of resources from the DFI. For a description of CPA Regulation Number 2, which applied to the DFI, and CPA Regulation Number 3, which applied to the PRB, see Appendix B. Program Review Board Guidance. The Director of the PRB provided directives that applied to contract management within CPA regions. Two of these directives addressed the management of the Rapid Regional Response Program (R3P): • PRB Guidance 06, “Rapid Regional Response Program Overview,” September 27, 2003 • PRB Guidance 06.2, “Rapid Regional Response Program Overview (amended),” December 14, 2003, and January 25, 2004 Rapid Regional Response Program. The R3P funds were derived from the DFI, and the CPA provided those funds to the Iraqi people for needed infrastructural repairs and 1 upgrades. The objectives of the R3P were to create local jobs, support local industries, and stimulate the economy. The R3P was initially conceived as a civilian equivalent of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program fund.2 Further, it was designed to provide maximum flexibility to regional and governorate coordinators in implementing projects responsive to the needs in their areas of responsibility. The program incorporated and expanded upon authorities of two previously funded programs: • the Director’s Emergency Response Program, which provided an emergency response capacity • the Construction Initiative, which provided greater funding authority for construction activities The discretionary authority under which regions could execute programs without prior Regional Program Coordinator approval was increased to $500,000 from $200,000 through PRB Guidance 06.2, “Rapid Regional Response Program Overview,” as amended on December 14, 2003, and January 25, 2004. South-Central Region. The CPA established the South-Central Regional office in the spring of 2003, and it was comprised of the provinces of Anbar, Babil, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wasit; which cover approximately half of the land mass of Iraq. SouthCentral Region personnel worked with the Iraqi people and coalition forces to establish the conditions for a free, sovereign, and democratically-elected representative government in Iraq. The top priorities of the South-Central Region were electricity, human rights, security, strategic communications, tribal democracy, and women’s rights. Organizations Responsible for Contract Management. The CPA was the authority responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq through June 28, 2004. Thereafter, the Iraqi Interim Government assumed the authority to govern Iraq. The responsibility for the DFI transferred from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government on June 28, 2004. For information on the CPA’s organizational responsibilities concerning contract management, until it ceased to exist on June 28, 2004, see Appendix C. Due to the dissolution of the CPA, four U.S. government organizations assumed responsibilities for the management of contracts and micro-purchase contracts in Iraq. For information on the present organizational responsibilities for the management of contracts and micro-purchase contracts in Iraq, see Appendix D. Project and Contracting Office. The Project and Contracting Office now has the responsibility to assess requirements for contracts. National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004; established the Project and Contracting Office and directed that it provide acquisition and project management support with respect to activities in Iraq, to include contract-related activities. The Project and Contracting Office reports through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. Iraq Reconstruction Management Office. The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office now has the responsibility to approve contracts. National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004, established the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office within the Department of State and directed 2 According to Combined Joint Task Force-7, Fragmentary Order 89, June 19, 2003, DFI funds were to be used to help fund the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program, which provides reconstruction assistance to the Iraqi people. 2 that organization to facilitate the transition in Iraq. The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office reports to the Chief of Mission in Iraq. Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan. The Head of Contracting Activity, Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan now has the responsibility to administer contracts. The Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan was established in 2004 to consolidate contracting activities and reports through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. Joint Area Support Group - Central Comptroller. The Joint Area Support Group - Central now has the financial responsibility3 for contracts. The CPA Comptroller, as part of the CPA, ceased to exist on June 28, 2004. When the CPA was dissolved, the CPA Comptroller was realigned as the Joint Area Support Group Central Comptroller. The Joint Area Support Group - Central Comptroller continued to perform the same duties for that portion of the DFI still administered by the U.S. Government. The Joint Area Support Group - Central reports to the Commander, Multi-National Force – Iraq. Objective The overall audit objective was to determine whether disbursing officers in selected locations in southern Iraq complied with applicable guidance and properly controlled and accounted for DFI cash assets and expenditures. During our audit, we observed deficiencies in contract award documentation and expanded our scope to determine whether CPA South-Central Region personnel properly managed contracts. For a discussion of the audit scope, methodology, and a summary of prior coverage, see Appendix A. For definitions of the acronyms used in this report, see Appendix J. For a list of the audit team members, see Appendix L. 3 The Joint Area Support Group-Central Comptroller provided funds to the CPA regions to disburse for contracts. Afterward, the disbursement documentation was returned to the Joint Area Support GroupCentral Comptroller’s office for review and to be cleared. 3 Management of Contracts and Micro-Purchase Contracts in the South-Central Region South-Central Region personnel, under the direction of the CPA, did not effectively manage 907 contracts and 1,212 micro-purchase contracts awarded through the R3P in the amount of $88.1 million. This condition occurred because South-Central Region personnel did not always: • follow established policies and procedures for authorizing, competing, and properly documenting contract awards • follow established policies and procedures for consolidating contracts • properly monitor contractor performance • use effective procedures to disburse funds for contracts • account for the funds disbursed for the contracts or determine how those funds were used • report lost cash to the CPA Comptroller, prevent payments that exceeded the award value of contracts, and prevent payments for unauthorized purposes • maintain adequate contract file documentation or R3P property book As a result, for 907 contracts and 1,212 micro-purchase contracts we reviewed: • 4 projects, using 20 contracts (2.2 percent) and several contract modifications, totaling approximately $9.1 million, appeared to have had the requirements split to keep the contract awards under the $500,000 approval threshold to circumvent the required reviews • 158 contracts (17.4 percent), totaling approximately $16.3 million, were either not competitively awarded or lacked documentation that showed a competitive process had taken place and 26 contract files (3.0 percent), totaling approximately $2.6 million, did not contain a signed contract • 11 contracts (1.2 percent), totaling more than $5.6 million, were issued without proper authorization and 38 contracts (4.2 percent), totaling approximately $7.0 million, were awarded after the transfer of responsibility for the DFI to the Iraqi government on June 28, 2004 • 91 projects (10.7 percent), totaling approximately $11.6 million, were paid in full at the time of contract signing and the completion of the project work was not verified; 11 contracts (1.2 percent) were overpaid by $571,823; approximately $515,000 was disbursed for CPA salaries and operations in violation of PRB Guidance 06.2 (amended); approximately between $47,000 and $87,000 in cash was lost but not reported to the CPA Comptroller; and approximately $23.0 million was transferred to unauthorized personnel but documentation showed only $6.3 million disbursed to contractors resulting in the loss of oversight of $16.7 million • 286 contract files (31.5 percent), totaling approximately $31.0 million, did not contain certificates of completion yet $24.0 million had been disbursed for the projects; while other contract files were missing documentation for approximately $12.6 million in disbursements and, consequently, it could not be determined whether contractors were paid for work performed 4