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66485b_TCR_Jan07 10/26/06 9:37 AM Page 192 Beyond Control and Rationality: Dewey, Aesthetics, Motivation, and Educative Experiences DAVID WONG Michigan State University Contemporary perspectives in psychology and education characterize ideal students as rational and in control of their thinking and actions. The good student is often described as intentional, cognitive, metacognitive, critical, and reflective. I begin with a brief history of control and rationality to establish how “The Tradition” is deeply rooted in philosophy, religion, and, in general, the story of Western civilization. Although these qualities are indeed important, I suggest that powerful educative experiences can neither be fully explained nor evoked if learners exercise only logical reasoning and self-control. I call on the aesthetic philosophy of Dewey and others to propose that transformative, compelling experiences require not only the rational, intentional processes of acting on the world, but also the non-rational, receptive process of undergoing. Dewey’s aesthetic experience, as described in “Art as Experience,” integrates both the rational and non-rational, and self-control and its opposite. In the implications section, I propose that anticipation—the imaginative sensing of possibility—as an important new motivation construct because it captures the aesthetic qualities of engaging educative experiences. I also discuss conditions that could support these kinds of experiences in the classroom. I conclude with a few provocative ideas: a new view of autonomy, the essential role of faith in education, value without work, suffering is passion, and responsibility redefined. CONTROL AND RATIONALITY IN PHILOSOPHY: THE TRADITION A few examples from Western philosophy illustrate how control and rationality are sine qua non to our image of the good student. Called the “Tradition” by Rorty (1982), the history of philosophy has promoted the value of thought based on logos since the time of early Greek philosophy. We can turn first to Socrates who famously asserted that the unexamined life was not worth living and, furthermore, that “there is only one good, knowledge, and one evil, ignorance.” In his role as public intellectual, Socrates wandered the streets of ancient Athens questioning those who presumed to be wise. Through his incessant——usually irritating—— interrogation, Socrates forced his audience to logically contradict themTeachers College Record Volume 109, Number 1, January 2007, pp. 192–220 Copyright © by Teachers College, Columbia University 0161-4681 66485b_TCR_Jan07 10/26/06 9:37 AM Page 193 Beyond Control and Rationality 193 selves and to reveal that they were not as wise as they thought themselves to be. Socrates’ life illustrates how action guided by reason is the highest virtue—certainly more important than action based on authority or position. In a related vein, accounts of Socrates often mention his mastery over his bodily self. He seemed impervious to the effect of weather, the pain of hunger and thirst, the intoxication of drink, and the temptation of love. Bertram Russell (1945) observed, “He was the perfect Orphic saint: in the dualism of heavenly soul and earthly body, he had achieved perfect mastery of the soul over the body” (p.91). Thus, in the life and philosophy of Socrates, we find evidence of two ideas that have endured till today—the separation of soul and mind from body and the elevation of reason over nature. After ancient Greece, the history of Western philosophy and theology has been, with a few notable exceptions, the story of the special status for human reason and control in the pursuit of knowledge, beauty, and morality. Several examples are sufficient to illustrate this point. First, Western philosophy and religion have often sought an elevated place for man in the kingdom of all living things. Reason and consciousness are often cited as the critical qualities that distinguish man from beast. Appetite, will, reflex, and instinct, unless severely restrained, are widely believed to lead inevitably to a life of ignorance and immorality. From this perspective, “naturalistic” philosophies that blur distinctions between man and animal are rejected. Similarly, Western culture emphasizes the rationality of the universe and man’s place in it. Existence has a purpose and design and it is man’s unique ability to grasp it intellectually. In this Tradition, it is not surprising that many are repulsed by Schopenhauer’s stark claim that human life has neither special status nor transcendent purpose. According to Schopenhauer, human existence is nothing more than an irrational “will to live.” To believe otherwise is wishful thinking. Schopenhauer (1969), and later Nietzsche (1968, 1976), assigned no special status to our faculty of reason. In fact, reason is subservient to the will—it exists only as an instrument for the will to live. It is not easy to accept Schopenhauer’s nihilism—the belief that human existence has no justifiable purpose and that there exists no basis for claiming one existence as better than another. For many, only our ability to bring order and control to our world saves us from Schopenhauer’s pessimism. Perhaps nowhere is the “rise of reason” in Western culture more vividly illustrated than in the French Enlightenment. Preceding the Enlightenment, the influence of the king, church, and nobility pervaded almost every aspect of life including law, government, and religion. However, a growing weariness of oppressive authority and an emerging 66485b_TCR_Jan07 10/26/06 9:37 AM Page 194 194 Teachers College Record belief in natural human rights formed the conditions for the dramatic political, philosophical, and religious changes of the Enlightenment. Often called the Age of Reason, the central tenets of the Enlightenment were the beliefs that authority should be questioned, ignorance was the cause of many societal ills, the ability to reason was a natural and inherently good quality of all human beings, and that the progress of humanity depended on reason. Thus, above all else, reason and knowledge were the keys for gaining responsible control of one’s own existence (Tarnas, 1993; Copleston, 1994; Russell, 1945). The confluence of philosophical and social forces was reinforced by events in science and religion. Newton’s mathematics revealed the rationality and laws of the universe. In religion, one’s relationship to God and even God’s existence were also seen as a matter of reason. Whereas the Church had been the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of faith, the Enlightenment saw a greater role assumed by individuals—reasoning individuals—to interpret the Bible for themselves. Reason gave people the ability to understand both God and the workings of the universe—its power seemed limitless, indeed. A PARALLEL AND OVERSHADOWED TRADITION The rise and valuing of human reason is a driving and organizing force in the story of Western philosophy and civilization. It would be a mistake, however, to believe that the story of Western culture is only about the importance of reason and control. Even as the Tradition of reason was given form in the Greek idea of logos, a parallel tradition—one that would be received less favorably in the millennia to follow—was emerging. An early example is the ancient Greek’s worship of Dionysus. Dionysus represented the sap, juice, or lifeblood element in nature, and lavish festal orgia (rites) in his honor were widely instituted. According to Russell (1945), these rites: . . . contained many barbaric elements, such as tearing wild animals to pieces and eating the whole of them raw. It had a curious element of feminism. Respectable matrons and maids, in large companies, would spend whole nights on the bare hills, in dances which stimulated ecstasy, and in an intoxication perhaps partly alcoholic, but mainly mystical. Husbands found the practice annoying, but did not dare oppose religion. (p.15 , see also Bacchae of Euripides (1880)) Dionysian worship was, in part, a reaction to the more civilized and sanctioned tendencies of Greek culture and fulfilled a longing for a more 66485b_TCR_Jan07 10/26/06 9:37 AM Page 195 Beyond Control and Rationality 195 instinctive and passionate way of life. At the time, the Greeks also worshipped Apollo, who, like Dionysus, was a creative force in music and poetry. Unlike Dionysus who was a blind, passionate energy, Apollo created by structuring, ordering, and reshaping. According to Nietzsche’s (1967) classic analysis, the Dionysian aesthetic experience was found in receptivity or surrender to the spirit of Nature in its immediate form. The Apollonian aesthetic, in contrast, involved acting upon or mastering Nature. In art, as well as in other aspects of life, the beautiful was a product of bringing order to chaos, restraint to excess, and rationality to nonrationality. Although the Apollonian aesthetic and the more general valuation of reason and control became the dominant tradition, the core ideas of the Dionysian aesthetics continued as a minor theme in philosophy, art, and culture. For example, the idea that the world does not fully yield to the power of reason inspired continued and diverse expression in the philosophy of Nietzsche, Schoepenhauer, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Camus. And, the philosophy, art, and literature of Romanticism can be seen as a reaction to Apollonian, Classicism, and Enlightenment’s precepts of order, harmony, balance, and rationality. Continuing the Dionysian tradition, Romanticists were inclined to exalt emotion over reason and creative imagination over strict adherence to formal rules and traditional procedures. Through history, expression of Dionysian ideals often seemed inspired as a reaction to the dominant tradition of reason. While the rise and fall of tension between the two traditions may make for a dramatic story and inspire many to choose one side or the other, Dewey and other holists would insist that the complete human experience is always the unity of the two. Thus, it is neither accurate nor sensible to assert that one side is more important than the other or to force an either/or choice. That said, in this essay I highlight contrasting perspectives as means to advance understanding. The challenge is discuss opposing qualities without being dualistic. Furthermore, I will pay more attention to non-rational and “opposite of control” qualities in aesthetic experiences. This essay is inclined in that direction not because these qualities are more important than rationality and control, but because they have not received as much attention in the domains of psychology and education. Control and rationality in psychology and education Not surprisingly, most contemporary perspectives in psychology and education reflect the broader Western zeitgeist. As a result, the ability to be rational and in control of oneself has become an important quality of the 66485b_TCR_Jan07 10/26/06 9:37 AM Page 196 196 Teachers College Record motivated learner. Standing back from one’s “self” or situation to gain understanding and control is often cited as a defining quality of higherorder psychological activities such as problem solving and reflection. Greeno, Collins, and Resnick (1996) have called this general perspective the “cognitive/rational” view. Central to this perspective is the work of Piaget (1952), for whom human development was the emergence of logico-mathematical reasoning, for example, the ability to interact with the world intentionally, abstractly, and from an objective distance. In this spirit, neo-Piagetian and information-processing theorists develop constructs such as executive processes, metamemory, and metacognition to emphasize that intelligence is the degree we are aware and in control of our thoughts and action (e.g., Case, 1985; Flavell & Wellman, 1977). Even Vygotsky (1978, 1986) who worked beyond the mainstream cognitive perspective saw higher order functioning as the ability to objectify experience in the form of language in order to control it. The relationship between control and general positive psychological outcomes may be most prominent in the study of intrinsic motivation— the kind of engagement often considered optimal in educational contexts. One of the most prominent treatments of intrinsic motivation has been Deci and Ryan’s Self-Determination Theory (Deci, 1981; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000). As the name suggests, the ability to choose and to control one’s self and world is virtually equated with what it means to be intrinsically motivated (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). Ryan and Deci (2000) assert: The fullest representations of humanity show people to be curious, vital, and self-motivated. At their best, they are agentic and inspired, striving to learn; extend themselves; master new skills; and apply their talents responsibly. The core belief that ideal learners are self-motivated, agentic, striving, extending, mastering, and responsible is also central to educators who posit that effective teaching should support intentional, thoughtful, problem-driven, student-centered activity. For example, the Fostering a Community of Learners (FCL) classrooms designed by Brown and Campione (1993) emphasize “learning by doing” and metacognitive reflection. Likewise, many of the innovative technology environments (e.g., Jasper, Cognition and Technology Group at Vanderbilt, 1992; CSILE, Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1994; Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1989) are designed to support student-directed exploration, problem solving, and intentional learning. 66485b_TCR_Jan07 10/26/06 9:37 AM Page 197 Beyond Control and Rationality 197 EXPLORING BEYOND THE REALM OF CONTROL AND RATIONALITY PROMSING WORK IN PSYCHOLOGY The preceding overview of philosophy and psychology is intended to elaborate the observation that a large majority of the work in education and psychology views rationality and control as essential to worthwhile, learning experiences. It is important to note, however, that there are important and vibrant efforts in both psychology and education to explore beyond the realm of control and rationality. Even Deci and Ryan (year), whose work I consider to exemplify the inclination to value conscious, intentional activity, suggest that motivation should be not only “agentic”, but also “inspired.” This suggestion acknowledges that the inspired qualities of motivation are the necessary complement to agentic qualities and invites consideration of how learners can be moved by things beyond their own intentions and goals. In this section, I draw attention to several examples of work that have looked beyond control and rationality to develop a fuller account of human experience. Flow Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) well-known notion of “flow” experiences— where performance is optimal and seemingly effortless—is intriguing in that it seems to be grounded in both the psychological traditions that highlight control and rationality as well as the realm beyond. The flow experience is deliberate in that there are clear goals, yet these goals have little connection to the self. Also, although feedback about one’s performance is important, there is a loss of awareness about one’s self. In the flow experience, one no longer perceives oneself as a separate entity acting upon something else; there is only the event in which one is an integral part. Clearly, the disappearance of the self and ego are central to Csikszentmihalyi’s view of optimal experiences. Yet, in the cognitive/rational tradition, the construct of the self and the importance of being aware of the self occupy a central role. The conscious individual is the one who sets goals, has plans and strategies, takes action, reflects upon actions, and makes attributions about the experience. A quick survey of numerous constructs associated with the term “self” is sufficient to make this point. Csikszentmihalyi’s work offers a rich perspective for considering the non-rational qualities of compelling learning experiences. Csikszentmihalyi not only examines qualities such as automatic, effortless 66485b_TCR_Jan07 10/26/06 9:37 AM Page 198 198 Teachers College Record performance and loss of self-consciousness, but also highlights the important role of emotions and immediate experience, ideas directly related to issues of aesthetics developed in this essay. On another note, his work focuses frequently on experts (in contrast to novice or intermediate learners) and on performance activities (in contrast to intellectual activities). Less attention seems to have been given to typical learners, where ordinary individuals are learning or improving their performance. Automaticity The work on automaticity also represents a significant foray into the realm beyond rationality and control. The work by Bargh and his colleagues emerges from a “dual-process” perspective that appreciates both the conscious and non-conscious information-processing aspects of experience (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). Bargh’s research has provided compelling evidence that goal-directed activity, judgment of others, self-regulation, and expert performance—processes thought to exemplify our cognitive/rational nature—are much less under our conscious control than we may wish to believe. Instead, psychological processes such as social perception, goal activation, and evaluation of others are frequently and readily activated as automatic and unconscious responses to environmental cues. Some of the most provocative research emphasizes how our non-conscious reactions may be contrary to our conscious, rational thinking. From an educational perspective, this kind of phenomenon represents a tantalizing opportunity for deep, transformative learning. To this point, however, relatively little attention has been given to the role of automatic, non-conscious processes in situations where significant learning is occurring. Typically, the non-conscious perceptions of interest are reflexive biases and prejudices. Scholars interested in automaticity could make important contributions to understanding the nature of compelling learning experiences if they turned their attention to the kinds of nonrational perceptions associated with the emergence of new meaning or intuition, in addition to perceptions associated with the activation of preexisting schema. The ecological and Gestalt perspectives are examples of other work within the cognitive tradition that attend more directly to how the meaning of situations may be apprehended without conscious, intentional cognition (Gibson, 1979; Greeno, 1994). In these traditions, the non-cognitive aspects of experience are seen as an invaluable source of qualitative, aesthetic meaning and insight. 66485b_TCR_Jan07 10/26/06 9:37 AM Page 199 Beyond Control and Rationality 199 Interest Another domain located, in part, in the realm beyond rationality and control is the study of learners’ interest. The study of interest has examined the degree to which learners’ are enjoying an activity or topic, prefer one thing rather than another, and want to continue with an activity in the near and distant future. Of particular relevance to this essay is the attention given to the inspired, emergent quality of engaging experiences (Renninger, Hidi, & Krapp, 1992). Their constructs of situational interest (a characteristic of the environment) and state interest (something emerging from the interaction of internal and external conditions) highlight the possibility that engagement can originate in things beyond our immediate control and rational understanding (Hidi & Anderson, 1992; Kintsch, 1980). Unfortunately, the construct of situational interest often carries a negative connation and is regularly contrasted with the more desirable dispositional interest—interest associated with intentional, learner-directed activity. Situational interest is temporary and superficial, rather than enduring and substantial. Garner, Gillingham and White’s (1989) work on how “seductive details” can distract readers from the main point of a text emphasizes this point. Similarly, Hidi, Baird and Hildyard (1982) report a negative correlation between the “interestingness” of text information and importance of this information. Perhaps interest that emerges spontaneously from the environment is undervalued because most work in this area is firmly grounded in the tradition of rationality and control. For example, throughout their influential book, “The Role of Interest in Learning and Development,” Renninger, Hidi, and Krapp (1992) emphasize that the ability to choose and control engagement are critical for sustained interest. The most worthwhile kind of interest emerges from something intrinsic to the learner, is selected by the learner, and is strategically managed by the learner. Person, environment, situation The analysis of flow and state interest are examples of perspectives where the individual is not seen as the center and origin of deeply engaging experience. Despite this shift in focus away from the individual and toward the environment, scholars in these areas should not be seen as occupying the same territory in the realm beyond rationality and control as the behaviorist camp. Instead, this new interactionism finds new ground by appreciating the person-environment interaction as a construct in itself, rather than as two separate constructs interacting with one 66485b_TCR_Jan07 10/26/06 9:37 AM Page 200 200 Teachers College Record another. In a similar move, socio-cultural and situative perspectives also recognize as a primary principle the fundamental unity of the personenvironment and eschew analyses that treat person and environment as separate, independent constructs (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Lave, 1988; Rogoff, 1990; Vygotsky, 1978, 1986). Constructs often associated with the cognition perspective such as knowledge, intelligence, and even the mind are assigned a new home beyond the boundary of the individual being. Even the study of aptitude, long considered an individual quality, has been affected. In his later work, Snow acknowledged it might be more fruitful to conceptualize aptitude as residing at the “interface” between person and situation, rather than as a characteristic belonging solely to the individual (Snow, 1994; Corno, Cronbach, Kupermintz, Lohman, Mandinach, Porteus, & Talbert, 2002). Scholars working these areas have the potential to offer insight into the nature of compelling, “moving” experiences. Their attention to the social and cultural aspects of a situation highlights how the process of learning is more than rational and that the individual is not the sole determinant of the nature of learning experiences. Socio-cultural and situative perspectives have been particularly well suited for understanding how learners acquire the values, beliefs, and practices of a community. The metaphors of appropriation and enculturation reflect this emphasis on learning as taking on the conventions and traditions of a community. However, less has been said about learning experiences characterized by creativity, insight, and breaking from convention. Emotion The area of work that is, perhaps, most readily associated with work in the realm beyond the rationality and control is research on emotions. A number of broad domains of scholarship can be seen as working to describe the emotions or feelings experienced in learning situations. Research on the brain, spurred by advancements in imaging technology, offers tantalizing glimpses into the relationship between emotions, cognition, and behavior. Another general domain in the study of emotions focuses on students’ feelings about themselves or their performance. Work in this area includes investigations of the nature of feelings such as pride, shame, guilt, and embarrassment (e.g., Tangney & Fischer, 1995), perceptions of competence and control (e.g., Harter & Connell, 1984), self-esteem (e.g., Seligman, 1991), and expectations and attributions about success and failure (e.g., Weiner, 1974). In this broad characterization of several areas in field of motivation, the emotions of concern are feelings that an indi- 66485b_TCR_Jan07 10/26/06 9:37 AM Page 201 Beyond Control and Rationality 201 vidual has about his or her self in relation to learning. The focus is more on feelings about the self in the learning experience than about the meaning in the experience. To fully capture the salient qualities of deeply engaging experiences, a broader palette of emotions is necessary. One kind of emotion is the feeling of understanding in an experience of learning. The term “feeling of understanding” highlights the vital quality of learning that is implicit, non-logical, and non-verbal. Examples include the feeling that an individual may have for the meaning of a difficult text passage, the symbolic significance of something in a work of art, the connection between an abstract idea and a concrete part of one’s world, or how a particularly difficult problem might be solved. (Flavell’s (1979) “metacognitive experience” is a related construct in that it describes a kind of non-rational awareness related to the process of comprehension. In my opinion, though, the metacognitive experience is a feeling about whether something makes sense or not, rather than a feeling about what sense something could make.) Another salient emotion in moving experiences is the feeling of inspiration. The word “inspired” means, in its etymological sense, to be filled with breath, spirit, and life. Thus, the emotion of learning at its most powerful is the feeling of increased vitality as we realize our growing capacity to perceive and act. This particular quality of experience is addressed indirectly, at best, in mainstream psychological traditions. For example, the motivation construct of goals is useful for describing how learning has direction and energy, but the intentional and a priori quality typically associated with goals hinders this construct’s ability to capture the inspired and spontaneous nature of compelling experiences. Furthermore, motivation researchers by and large view goals as a cognitive element of learning and emotion as an unnecessary or epiphenomenal quality of goals. For example, students can have a goal, such as studying for a test. In order to describe how they feel about studying requires another construct, such as “value” (e.g., Shah & Higgins, 1997). Thus, learners’ feelings about a goal is a separate and, typically, secondary concern from the goal itself. It should be apparent by now that I have chosen to step over conventional boundaries in my use of the terms “emotion” and “feeling.” I have assigned these spontaneous, non-rational processes to a role that is equal in importance to the role of intentional, rational processes in the experience of learning. I am looking beyond the perspective that sees emotions as separate and subordinate to thinking—a perspective that also prefers rationality over intuition and science over art as the way to understand the world. To push against this historical inclination is a difficult and,